Abstract. This paper describes a way of using the process algebra CSP to enable controlled interaction between concurrent B machines. This approach supports compositional veri cation: each of the controlled machines, and the combination of controller processes, can be analysed and veri ed separately in such a way as to guarantee correctness of the combined communicating system. Reasoning about controlled machines separately is possible due to the introduction of guards and assertions into description of the controller processes in order to capture assumptions about other controlled machines and provide guarantees to the rest of the system. The veri cation process can be completely supported by di erent tools. The use of separate controller processes facilitates the iterative development and analysis of complex control ows within the system. The approach is motivated and illustrated with a non-trivial running example.
Introduction
This paper introduces a new approach to combining concurrent B machines in a veri able way. One of the main motivations for the approach is the desire to make use of existing tool support for all aspects of the veri cation, and for the generation of executable code within the B-Method. This builds on previous work 12{14] using the process algebra CSP 6] to describe controllers for B machines, in order to express and reason about complex ows of control in a natural way. Previous work has been concerned with a single controller process P encapsulating a single ow of control for a B machine M ; M can be a single machine or be comprised of a hierarchy of machines. We also focussed on methods for proving that a controller is consistent with its underlying machine. In this paper we consider how a collection of such combinations (of B machines M i and their controllers P i ) can interact. The controllers play a key role in enabling communication between the machines. We propose an architecture (pictured in Figure 1 ) which forces all interaction between machines to be through the controllers. The architecture is therefore appropriate both when controlled machines are distributed across a network and when they are executed on the same processor. This enables deadlock and divergence freedom of a combined communicating system to be veri ed in a compositional way, simply by analysing smaller parts of the system: the individual controlled machines P i k M i , and the parallel combination of only the P i (without the M i ). Overall correctness follows automatically from Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 presented in Section 4.2. This means that existing tools for the B-Method and for process algebra can be used to verify our system descriptions. Other properties of the combined communicating system can also be speci ed within the process algebra and established using existing tools.
In practice, we nd that the correctness of particular controlled machines within the system rests on the behaviour of other controlled machines, and aspects of the rest of the system's behaviour must be incorporated into the veri cation. We achieve this by extending the language of controllers to include guards (which block unwanted inputs) and assertions (which diverge on unexpected communications). Guards on an input channel of a controller P are used to describe the inputs expected from the rest of the system, and thus capture the assumptions about the process' environment. This enables P to be analysed in the absence of the rest of the system. Assertions on outputs to the rest of the system describe what the process itself should guarantee. Assertions are also used to encapsulate the expectations on inputs to a controller P from its associated machine M . This enables the combination of controllers to be analysed together, independently of the machines they control, and hence entirely at the level of process algebra.
The development of a combined communicating system proposed in this paper will involve the following steps:
1. De ne the individual B machines, 2. Give CSP controllers for them that describe the ow of control for their use, 3. Prove consistency between the B machines and their controllers, 4. Prove deadlock freedom of the combination of the controllers, 5. Re ne and implement the machines and controllers independently. This process will be illustrated by the running example. This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the CSP controller language and semantics; Section 3 describes the running example used to motivate and illustrate the approach; Section 4 is concerned with the consistency results which underpin the approach, and the use of assertions and guards; and Section 5 ends with a discussion. The paper assumes familiarity with AMN; further details can be found in 1].
CSP Controllers and B Machines

Notation
Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) is a language for describing processes of concurrent systems and their patterns of interactions. The unit of interaction is the atomic event which processes perform and on which they synchronise. Events can be unstructured (such as start), or they can have some We will use a subset of CSP to describe the controllers for B machines. The language we use is based on the language in 13, 14] and is given by the following pseudo-BNF rule; P ::= a ! P j c?xhE(x)i ! P j d!vfE(v)g ! Pj e?v!xfE(x)g ! P j P 1 2 P 2 j P 1 u P 2 j u xjE(x) P j if b then P 1 else P 2 end j S(p)
where a 2 and is a synchronisation event, c is a communication channel accepting inputs, d is a communication channel sending output values, e is a machine channel, x represents all data variables on a channel, v represents all data values being passed along a channel, E(x) is a predicate on x (it may be elided, in which case it is considered to be true), b is a boolean expression, and p is a process expression. All the terms in the above grammar have established CSP semantics and can be modelled in a CSP model checker such as FDR 8] without any extensions. We will explain each expression shortly but before doing so we need to clarify our use of channels.
In our language we want to distinguish between communication via individual CSP processes and the inter-communication of CSP processes with their underlying B machines, as shown in Figure 1 .
Synchronisation events and communication channels serve as communication mediums between two CSP controllers and they have no correspondence with B operations. Conversely, a machine channel corresponds to a B operation, with the same types for inputs and outputs. The machine channel comprising of input and output also admits degenerate cases, in which either or both the ? and ! may be dropped. These cases are all treated as special instances of the machine channel, and do not require separate treatment. For example, a machine channel with no input and outputs will simply correspond to a B operation with no parameters.
The expression, a ! P, means that a process is prepared to engage in the event a, and subsequently behave as P. It is used to provide a way of synchronising on atomic events.
Another expression which makes use of the pre x operator (!) is the expression c?xhE(x)i ! P. It denotes a process that is initially prepared to accept any value x on the communication channel c that meets the guard predicate E(x), after which it behaves as the process P (which may depend on the value of x) but it will not accept any x that fails to meet that predicate. Guards can be modelled in FDR using standard CSP syntax. 
where DIV represents a divergent process.
The expression e?v!xfE(x)g ! P is initially prepared to allow a process to interact on machine channel e. This channel will be used to communicate with a B machine via its corresponding operation x ? e(v), so it provides v as input to the B machine (indicated by the ?), and accepts x as output (indicated by the !). If the value x it receives meets the predicate E(x) then it behaves as the process P which may depend on the value of x, otherwise it diverges. Observe that the CSP semantics of this term will be the same as an event communicating over an output and input channel in standard CSP (for example e!v?xfE(x)g).
The external choice, P 1 2 P 2 is initially prepared to behave either as P 1 or as P 2 , with the choice being made on occurrence of the rst event. The choice of the rst event is made by the environment of the choice. Conversely, the choice P 1 u P 2 chooses internally whether to behave as P 1 or as P 2 , and its environment has no control over the way the choice is resolved. Indexed internal choice ( u ) chooses a value x such that is meets the predicate E(x) and then behaves as the process P which may depend on the value of x. Another form of choice is controlled by the value of a boolean expression in an if expression.
S(p) is a process name where p is an expression. Each process expression contains a recursive call, S(p). For example, a process which manages a set of values can be described by a recursive family indexed by sets:
Observe the use of the guard on the input channel in to block the input of any value which is already in the set S; and that some arbitrary member of S is selected for output.
Note that the di erence with the above language and the one used in our previous work is the inclusion of an output communication channel (!), internal choice (u), and indexed internal choice ( u ). Furthermore, the use of the input channel ? and the atomic event a have been restricted to describing communication between CSP controllers, and they no longer correspond to underlying B operations. We have also augmented machine and communication channels with assertions and guards. This rationalisation of the notation is necessary because we need to deal with concurrency cleanly. In this paper we have also restricted the language to non-terminating controllers; but the inclusion of terminating loops is discussed in 15] .
In addition to the language for controllers, CSP provides a number of other operators, including parallel composition: P 1 k P 2 . There is also an indexed form k i P i . A parallel combination executes P 1 and P 2 concurrently, requiring that they synchronise on events in both their alphabets, and allowing independent performance of events outside their alphabets. In this paper the alphabet of a process will be all the events that it can perform. This allows messages to pass along channels. 
Semantics
CSP processes are identi ed with the observations that can be made of them: thus the semantics of a CSP process will be a set of observations. The precise form of the observations will describe the CSP model. The traces model uses traces as observations. The stable failures model uses traces along with subsequent refusals. The failures/divergences model uses traces, divergences, and failures. We brie y describe them here. A fuller explanation can be found in 10].
A trace tr of a process P is a nite sequence of events that it may be observed to engage in. The traces model identi es a process with its set of traces.
A divergence of a process P is a sequence of events tr such that P reaches a divergent state (which may be thought of as entering a non-terminating loop, or in speci cation terms as a speci cation which allows any behaviour) during the performance of the sequence of events tr. A process is divergence-free if it has no divergences. Divergence denotes undesirable behaviour, and it is generally useful to establish that a process is divergence-free.
A refusal of a process P is a set X of events that P might be initially prepared to refuse. A stable failure of a process P is a trace/refusal pair (tr; X ) such that P can initially perform the sequence of events tr, and reach a non-divergent state in which every event in X is refused. The stable failures of P is denoted
If for some tr (tr; ) 2 F SF P]] then P can reach a state in which no event at all is possible, and we say that P has a deadlock. If there is no such stable failure, then P is deadlock-free. The CSP model-checker FDR allows checks for deadlock and divergence freedom to be made automatically for processes.
Example
We describe and motivate the approach of this paper through an illustrative example. This section illustrates the use of the above control language in specifying CSP controllers to drive underlying B machines. Each individual controller acts as an interface for its underlying machines and provides a possible pattern of execution. The aim is to compose a collection of controlled machines in order to specify a large combined communicating system.
For the purposes of presentation we rst describe the machines and then the associated controllers. In practice, we develop both alongside each other, since both impact on each other's speci cation as we shall see in Section 3.2 when we discuss the particular controllers. The B-Toolkit 9] and FDR source les for the example can be downloaded at http://www.cs.rhul.ac.uk/home/helen/papers/zb2002/sources.tar.gz
Machines
Consider two B machines, CustomerData and CheckoutData, which are de ned in Figures 2 and 3 respectively. The purpose of these machines is to capture information about customers who are shopping and process them through checkout queues in a supermarket. The separation of customers and checkout processing illustrates our approach of modelling di erent parts of the speci cation separately.
The customer information is captured in the CustomerData machine. It introduces the variable customer to track whether an individual customer is either shopping or paying (i.e. the customers' status). The set of all possible customers, CUSTOMERS is declared in a separate context machine, Types, as shown in Figure 4 . Similarly, the set de ning the customers' status, STATUS, is declared in the same context machine. This allows more than one machine to use static information and is typical of B developments.
Four operations are o ered by CustomerData: beginshopping allows a customer to become a shopper; whatstate queries the status of a customer; proceedtocheckout updates a customer from being one who is shopping to one who is 
Controllers
In order to compose two B machines into a combined communicating system we introduce CSP controllers for each of them which communicate with one another.
To be consistent with the B machines the controllers must ensure that operations are always called within their preconditions. In this section we present the controllers which drive the CustomerData and CheckoutData machines. Specifying the controllers, CustomerProc and CheckoutProc below, allows us to build the system ((CustomerProc k CustomerData) k (CheckoutProc k CheckoutData)). Figure 5 illustrates the overall architecture of the whole system and highlights all the channels involved. CustomerProc is a controller which deals with customer requests, and is given in Figure 6 . The process CustomerProc is de ned in terms of a parameterised recursion. The parameter custset holds the set of customers currently paying. Initially, there will be no such customers and the set is empty. Note that the state carried around in this controller is more abstract than the state in the underlying B machine. In practice, our aim is to minimise the amount of state in the CSP controller. However, some state may be necessary in order to determine the ow of control in a process and/or for use in specifying assertions and guards, as is the case with custset. There are three main paths of execution which are controlled by external choice. The rst path accepts customers provided they are not already paying. This is ensured by the guard of the communication channel initiate, (cc 2 CUSTOMERS ?custset). We proceed after accepting an appropriate customer to observe a communication of that customer value along the beginshopping channel which corresponds to the underlying B operation assigning his/her status to be shopping. Allowing only certain customers means that the precondition of the beginshopping operation will be discharged when invoked. It is true that the above constraint on customers could have been modelled as a select statement in B but our philosophy is never to block B operations, so that we can implement the operations in ANSI C within the B-Toolkit. The role of guards and assertions will be examined in more detail in Section 4.3.
The second path processes a customer. If the customer is already shopping then the underlying B state of that customer is updated followed by a message being passed along com1 communicating to CheckoutProc that the customer can now join a queue. Note that the assertion denotes the assumption that the customer is not already paying. Note also that the parameter in the recursive call updates the custset to include the new customer. In the case where the customer is not shopping an error is reported and no underlying B state is a ected.
Observe that a request to process a customer could occur even before he/she has begun shopping and thus impacting on the speci cation of the whatstate operation. Initially, we had used a simple assignment and a precondition stating that cust 2 dom(customer). The operation in Figure 2 is far more robust and allows the operation to be called with any customer as its input. In order to achieve this particular style of speci cation we augment the datatype STATUS to include an extra enumeration, idle, as shown in Figure 4 .
The third path records the fact that a customer has nished shopping. The particular customer, whose status is to be updated, will be communicated along com2. The guard on the channel re ects our understanding that the customer will be one who is currently paying. Here again the guard is used to dischargee CheckoutProc is a controller which controls the opening and closing of supermarket counters, and the processing of customers in queues associated with those counters. The process CheckoutProc is de ned, in Figure 7 , in terms of a parameterised recursion. The parameter custque holds the set of customers currently in a queue. Initially, there are no such customers.
There are ve main possible execution paths in CheckoutProc. The rst path e ectively invokes the underlying B operation to open a counter if at all possible.
The second path closes a counter. The assertion on the output set out que serves to a rm our belief that the customers in the set are queueing customers.
The third path illustrates how the choice of which counter will be serviced next is resolved by the controller. The information regarding counters is not captured in the controller (at this stage, though it may be included in a re nement at a later stage) and so it could be the case that an empty counter is passed as an input to the B operation serve. Therefore, the B operation needs to be robust enough to allow for this possibility. It achieves this by outputting a report value, indicating success or failure of the operation. The report value is used to control the ow of execution so that either com2 communicates that the customer was served successfully or no such communication occurs. Note that there is only one assertion on the output values of the machine channel serve. This is essential since the cust value may not always be in the queueing set.
The fourth path allows a new customer to join a queue. A synchronisation along the communication channel com1 provides the particular customer wishing to join a queue. The guard on the input channel means that we never want to follow this path of execution if the customer is already in a queue. Once a customer is received we then proceed to choose a counter whose queue the customer can join. If there are no open counters then we must open one before the customer is allowed to join its queue. Otherwise he/she is simply appended to the queue of the chosen counter. The operation join(co; cu) corresponding to join?out co?cust has a precondition stating that the customer can only join provided he/she is not already present in any of the queues of the open counters. The guard on the communicationchannel com1 ensures that the cust value meets that precondition.
We originally speci ed the do open operation with no parameters. During the development of the fourth main execution path we realised that an output parameter was necessary. Consider the following scenario, after performing a choose operation the control process reads the rep variable in order to decide whether an open counter has been successfully chosen or whether no counters are open and so a failure is reported by the operation. In the latter case we then proceed to non-deterministically choose to open a counter using the do open operation and then allow the customer to join a queue. The problem is that the counter being passed to the join operation may not be the same as the one opened by the do open operation. This inconsistency problem is solved by augmenting the do open operation with an output parameter and passing this output value to the join operation. The repercussions of this change on process Q2 is that the do open operation in the rst branch of the choice needs to be consistent in its signature. In the rst path the value being passed along the output channel is never used but this is allowable.
The fth path of process Q2 either removes a customer from the queue or reports an error. If the customer is successfully removed from the queue then Q2 forces a synchronisation to occur on channel com2 so that the information about the particular customer is also updated, as we described above.
The above example demonstrates that specifying how the operations are used in controllers forces us to consider their interface and robustness very carefully. If the operations are not robust, that is they contain preconditions, then those preconditions must be discharged by the CSP controller. Furthermore, the controllers themselves enable us to clearly visualise the ow of information between controlled machines in a combined communicating system. In the example all interactions between CustomerProc and CheckoutProc have been along machine channels com1 and com2 passing values. However, in general the language, presented in Section 2.1, also allows pure synchronisations (such as a start event).
In this section we discuss how consistency, i.e. divergence and deadlock freedom, of combined communicating systems can be established in a compositional way. There are two separate steps involved in the veri cation process (steps 3 and 4 in the overall development process outlined in Section 1). First, in Section 4.1, we check that each individual controlled machine is divergencefree. Second, we check deadlock freedom of the combination of the individual controllers without their underlying machines. In the case of our example, these steps involve checking that (CustomerProc k CustomerData) and (CheckoutProc k CheckoutData) are both divergence-free, and then checking that (CustomerProc k CheckoutProc) is deadlock-free. These two steps can be supported by the B-Toolkit and FDR respectively. The results, presented in Section 4.2, verify that these two separate steps are enough to ensure deadlock and divergence freedom of a combined communicating system, in our case ((CustomerProc k CustomerData) k (CheckoutProc k CheckoutData)) divergenceand deadlock-free.
Consistency of Single Controlled Machine
When we consider a controller P for a machine M , we have previous results which establish when the CSP controller is appropriate for the B machine: it must not call operations which fail to meet their preconditions. This means that within the failures/divergences semantics for P and M , the parallel combination (P k M ) must be divergence-free. The following is the essence of the result from 12,14] giving a su cient condition to guarantee divergence freedom: Theorem 1. If CLI (control loop invariant) is a predicate such that CLI^I ) fBBODY S(p) g]CLI for each BBODY S(p) in P then (P k M ) is divergence-free.
The theorem states that the invariant CLI need not necessarily hold after each individual operation but must hold at each recursive call of a controller. As in 12,14], we de ne a maximum sequence of operations, fBBODY S(p) g, to be the translation of a process expression associated with S(p) up to and including reaching a recursive call. If such a sequence of operations can establish the CLI then we know that all the operations are called within their preconditions and terminate. Thus if the CLI holds for all such process expressions within P then we have a way of checking whether any machine M acting under its controller P can diverge.
The above result also holds for this paper's CSP controller language, which allows P to have additional channels which are independent of M ; and to have assertions and guards on the values passed along channels. In order to ensure this we have to provide extra cases in the translation of process expressions to their corresponding sequences of operations and simplify some existing cases. For example, the translation of communication channels which have no underlying operations from M are outlined as follows; fc?xhE(x)i ! Pg = ANY x WHERE E(x) THEN fPg END fd!vfE(v)g ! Pg = PRE E(v) THEN fPg END Indexed internal choice u xjE(x) P is also translated using an ANY clause, and is akin to a guard on a communication channel. The fully formal treatment can be found in 15] .
Note that the translation rules above reveal why the annotations of CSP channels were termed assertions and guards. We wanted to model predicates on inputs as guards which when violated would be identi ed in the CSP analysis in the second step of veri cation when checking deadlock freedom. On the other hand we wanted to model predicates on outputs as assertions which would be discharged (in step one) when checking the individual controlled machines, P i k M i , using the above result.
In our example, an appropriate CLI for (CustomerProc k CustomerData) is custset = customer ?1 fpayingg]. It states that the set carried in the parameter of the process will match the set of customers who are paying, and this will be true at the start of the loop and hold at each recursive call. A suitable CLI for (CheckoutProc k CheckoutData) is custque = S cc:(cc 2 dom(queues) j ran(queues(cc)). It states that the set carried in the parameter will match the set of all customers in all of the queues. Again this will be true at the start of the loop and hold at each recursive call.
Consistency of Multiple Controlled Machines
Here we consider two B machines M 1 and M 2 under the control of their respective CSP controllers P 1 and P 2 , whose overall architecture has been previously depicted in Figure 1 . Formally, we have the following constraints on the alphabets of the controllers and machines:
Thus each M i communicates only with its associated P i , and the various P i communicate with each other, and with the environment of the combination, on separate channels not involving the M i .
The results below verify that in order to check deadlock and divergence freedom of the overall combination, only two steps are needed, i.e. it is su cient to rstly check divergence-freedom of each controlled machine separately, and then to check deadlock freedom only of the combination of the CSP controllers.
Proof. This follows immediately from the semantics of parallel composition in the failures/divergences model: parallel composition preserves divergencefreedom.
As Theorem 2 extends to any number of B machines to be combined in parallel. Thus, Theorem 2 is proved for the general case in the appendix A. The overriding principle is that each B machine should have its own CSP controller, and any interaction it has with its controller is private between them, and no other process participates in it. Communication between controlled machines takes place between the CSP controllers using channels which are independent of the B machines. Using this scheme, all that needs to be checked to establish overall divergence freedom is that each P i k M i is divergence-free; and all that then needs to be checked to establish overall deadlock freedom is that the parallel combination k i P i is deadlock-free. The above results also extend to divergencefree controllers which do not have underlying B machines, as we shall see in Section 4.4.
Role of Assertions and Guards
Assertions and guards allow the overall system to be split into pieces that can each be independently veri ed. They are used to carry the assumptions and guarantees to decompose the proof obligations on the overall system to proof obligations on small combinations of controlled machines within the system. Moreover, they make explicit the designer's understanding of why the controlled machines should behave correctly when combined.
The assertions on outputs (along machine and communication channels) give conditions that any output value must have. Since failure to meet such an assertion results in a divergence, a successful divergence freedom check of a P i k M i ensures that any output from P i meets the assertion. Making such assertions too strong however will result in P i k M i failing to be divergence-free. For example, if we had included, in Figure 7 , the simpler assertion cust 2 custque on the serve communication channel then (CheckoutProc k CheckoutData) would not be divergence-free; since we could not always guarantee that the output provided by the serve operation in CheckoutData met the assertion required by CheckoutProc. Using assertions on machine and communication channels means that values failing such assertions will be ignored when k i P i is analysed for deadlocks in the stable failures model, since a divergence never reaches a stable state in order to contribute to a deadlock.
Guards on inputs on communication channels are also used when checking a particular P i k M i for possible divergences. Without the guards on inputs to the P i s, some inputs which are not possible within the system as a whole might give rise to a divergence within some particular P i k M i when considered separately.
Observe that without the guards and assertions in the example, the machines (CustomerProc k CustomerData) and (CheckoutProc k CheckoutData) would not have been divergence-free. For example, if we had omitted the guard on the cust input value along com1 in the fourth branch of the choice in Q2 (Figure 7 ) then the precondition of the join operation can be violated on some inputs. Guards must also be taken into account in the deadlock freedom checks of the combined controllers. Making a guard too strong may result in a deadlock when checking k i P i .
If the output assertion on a communication channel between two controllers is the same as (or stronger than) the input guard, then both assertion and guard may be dropped from the controllers once the veri cation process is complete. In other words, having proven that all messages passed around the system meet the appropriate conditions, they do not require checking at run-time and so they can be dropped from the controller implementations. In the case of CustomerProc this also means that we no longer need to keep track of the set of paying customers in the recursion and as a result we obtain a simpler controller.
Note that we have not included guards on input values along machine channels in our language. M is not analysed independently of P, so guards capturing properties of inputs from P do not need to be given explicitly.
Developing Controllers
In Section 3.2 we developed two controllers. In fact an analysis using FDR shows that (CustomerProc k CheckoutProc) is not deadlock-free. In retrospect this is not surprising given the complex interactions that occurs between the controllers, and some further development of the controllers was necessary.
This parallel combination of processes can deadlock because CustomerProc can follow a path starting with a process event which leads to a point where it must synchronise with CheckoutProc on com1 to proceed. However, CheckoutProc can follow a path starting with remove or serve which lead to a point where it must synchronise with CustomerProc on com2 to proceed. If CustomerProc and CheckoutProc both follow these paths at the same time, then they can reach a state in which they cannot synchronise on either com1 or com2.
Therefore, if we are to guarantee deadlock freedom of the controllers, one solution is to introduce a regulator process REG in parallel, which ensures that only one of these paths is entered at any time. Once one process has entered such a critical path, the other process will be blocked from entering a critical path of its own until the relevant com has occurred. An appropriate REG for our example is given in Figure 8 and we can establish that (CustomerProc k CheckoutProc k REG) is deadlock-free (now step two of the veri cation process is nished). The REG process has no assertions, no guards and hence is divergencefree. It also has no underlying B machines, or equivalently (to apply Theorem 2) it can be considered as having a vacuous B machine M 0 with no operations.
Thus REG = REG jj M 0 , which is therefore divergence-free. Therefore, all the controlled machines in our example pass step one of the veri cation process. In turn the overall example is divergence-and deadlock-free.
In general, if the REG process includes assertions and guards, they would be treated in exactly the same way as for controllers with underlying B machines. We would need to prove that REG was divergence-free using our previous result; any assertions and guards would have to hold simply by virtue of the CSP description.
Observe that the regulator process forces a synchronisation on the pickcounter communication channel. In the original version of CheckoutProc, in Figure 7 , we started the branch which serves a customer with a communication along the serve machine channel. The introduction of the regulator process meant that we had to force the synchronisation on a communication channel and not on a machine channel, and so we introduced the pickcounter channel. This is important since we do not allow two controllers to control the same underlying B operation. Our approach is to couple a single controller and a machine together.
Discussion
The B-Method provides supports for the speci cation and development of software system requirements in terms of a collection of operations which the system must implement. It is ultimately necessary to have some way of describing the ow of control which directs operation calls. We have outlined one way in this paper. Alternative approaches include the direct introduction of actions (operations with blocking guards) within the B description 2]; or the use of a process algebra to describe a ow of control explicitly as a prelude to translation into B 5] . Both these approaches support the speci cation of such systems using tools. However, the main di erence between their approaches and ours is the lack of a complete development path to executable code using existing tool support (due to select not being implementable). Our B machines can use the B-Toolkit to generate executable code. Preliminary investigations also show that CSP controllers can be naturally expressed in Java 15] .
In this paper we have shown how the complex interactions between B machines and ow of control of their operations can be naturally expressed using CSP. Through the observations made when presenting the paper's example it is clear that our approach to describing combined communicating systems is iterative and compositional. The bene t of compositionality is that the veri cation of controllers and their machines can be done separately. This compositionality is achieved by the addition of assertions and guards to the CSP controller language, and the distinct architecture used to build combined communicating systems.
A further bene t of our approach is the ability to re ne each controller and machine separately whilst maintaining divergence and deadlock freedom. For example, we could re ne the CheckoutProc controller to keep track of the open counters explicitly, and thus re ning the internal choice to be a choice over the set of open counters.
In this paper we have focused on verifying deadlock freedom of controllers. Using tool support in the veri cation process was useful and highlighted the fact that it is not straightforward to specify deadlock-free controllers. Other requirements on the communication patterns of combined communicating system can also be checked using FDR. These are generally speci ed either in terms of the process algebra itself, or as a predicate on the traces of the system. This is the subject of current research.
